Algorithmic Bidding for Virtual Trading in Electricity Markets by Baltaoglu, Sevi et al.
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 14, NO. 8, AUGUST 2015 1
Algorithmic Bidding for Virtual Trading
in Electricity Markets
Sevi Baltaoglu, Lang Tong, Fellow, IEEE, and Qing Zhao, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—We consider the problem of optimal bidding for
virtual trading in two-settlement electricity markets. A virtual
trader aims to arbitrage on the differences between day-ahead
and real-time market prices; both prices, however, are random
and unknown to market participants. An online learning algo-
rithm is proposed to maximize the cumulative payoff over a finite
number of trading sessions by allocating the trader’s budget
among his bids for K options in each session. It is shown that
the expected payoff of the proposed algorithm converges, with an
almost optimal convergence rate, to the expected payoff of the
global optimal corresponding to the case when the underlying
price distribution is known. The proposed algorithm is also
generalized for trading strategies with a risk measure. By using
both cumulative payoff and Sharpe ratio as performance metrics,
evaluations were performed based on historical data spanning
ten year period of NYISO and PJM markets. It was shown that
the proposed strategy outperforms standard benchmarks and the
S&P 500 index over the same period.
Index Terms—Electricity markets, virtual transactions, algo-
rithmic bidding, online machine learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE wholesale electricity market in the United Statesconsists of a day-ahead (DA) and a real-time (RT)
markets. Market participants submit their bids to buy (and
offers to sell) electricity to the DA market approximately one
day ahead of time. The bids and offers cleared in the DA
market are financially binding. The market clearing process
sets the DA prices for each hour of the day and at each location
of the network.
In the RT market, the load (thus the generation) may not
match to the cleared amount in the DA market, and the RT
prices of electricity may also be different from their DA coun-
terparts due to a variety of reasons, including the unexpected
levels of demand and supply, unplanned outages, unpredictable
weather conditions [1], and possibilities of market participants
exercising market power [2].
Price discrepancies between the DA and RT markets rep-
resent a form of market inefficiency. To promote price con-
vergence between the two markets, in early 2000s, virtual
trading was introduced in the U.S. electricity markets. Virtual
trading is a financial mechanism that allows market par-
ticipants and external financial entities to arbitrage on the
differences between DA and RT prices. Currently, cleared
Sevi Baltaoglu, Lang Tong, and Qing Zhao are with the School of Electrical
and Computer Engineering, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, 14850 USA e-
mail: {msb372,lt35,qz16}@cornell.edu.
This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation under
Award 1809830 and 1816397.
Part of the work was presented at Conference on Neural Information
Processing Systems (NIPS) 2017.
virtual transactions represent a significant fraction of total
energy trade. In 2013, the cleared virtual transactions in the
five major electricity markets was 13% 1 of the total load [3].
Empirical and theoretical studies have shown that increased
competition due to virtual trading results in price convergence,
thus improving market efficiency [1], [2], [4]–[9]. Particularly,
it has been argued in [5] that a virtual trader makes profit if
and only if his participation drives the DA-RT price difference
toward zero. Hence, to reach the socially optimal dispatch
level, it is important that the virtual traders bid optimally.
However, the DA and RT wholesale prices are random due
to uncertainties in demand, supply, and operation conditions.
Therefore, in order to learn the optimal trading strategy, a
virtual trader needs to update his belief using all the new
information, which allows him to adapt his bid accordingly
each day.
A. Main Contributions
In an electricity market, there are potentially thousands
of trading options. Due to system congestion and losses,
electricity prices vary in time and across locations. The goal
of this work is to develop an online learning approach to
virtual trading where the trader, who is constrained by a
certain budget, aims to determine profitable trading options
and distribute his budget among them. By online learning we
mean that bids are constructed sequentially and adaptively
based on the new information available. In particular, we
consider the objective of maximizing the expected total payoff
as well as one that involves a mean-variance type of risk
measure.
The main contribution of this work is a polynomial-time
online learning algorithm that maximizes the expected cumu-
lative return over a finite T trading horizon. This result is
also generalized to an objective based on a form of mean-
variance risk measure. Note that obtaining the optimal bidding
strategy with known joint DA and RT price distribution is itself
nontrivial due to the non-convexity of the problem. Our result
provides an algorithmic bidding strategy that converges to the
global optimal bidding strategy. We show further that the rate
of convergence achieves the lower bound of convergence of
all such algorithms up to a
√
log(T ) factor. To establish the
order-optimality of convergence, the regret measure is used.
In particular, the regret of an online learning algorithm is
the difference between the expected total T-period payoff of
that algorithm and that of the global optimal bidding strategy
1This number goes up to 38% with the inclusion of up-to-congestion
transactions of PJM.
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when the underlying probability model of DA and RT prices
is known.
A significant part of this work is to evaluate the performance
of the proposed strategy empirically using historical data
spanning the time period between 2006 and 2016 of NYISO
and PJM markets. Extensive empirical analysis show that the
proposed strategy consistently outperforms benchmark heuris-
tic methods, derived from other machine learning approaches,
and achieves significant profit. It is worth noting that our
empirical results also show that PJM and NYISO wholesale
electricity markets are both profitable although PJM market
presents better opportunities to traders compared to NYISO.
B. Related Work
Relevant literature falls into two categories. The one that
is more directly related to our work focuses on developing
online learning algorithms to similar problems in the machine
learning literature. The second one focuses on understanding
the effects of virtual trading on the two-settlement electricity
market.
Within the machine learning literature, most relevant work
is algorithmic bidding in online advertising markets [10]. The
authors of [10] consider the online bidding problem without
a budget constraint where the bidder observes market prices
only if his bid is accepted at that period. In contrast, our
problem falls into the category of stochastic experts problem
because historical market prices are observable regardless of
the bid of the virtual trader. The analysis in [10] on the lower
bound of regret does not hold for the problem considered
here. Furthermore, their algorithm cannot be used here due
to the budget constraint. Our problem is a special case of the
setting studied by Kleinberg and Slivkins [11]. Unfortunately,
the computational complexity of the algorithm in [11] grows
exponentially with the number of options. Therefore, it be-
comes intractable in practice. Also, the regret lower bound in
[11] doesn’t provide a bound for our problem with a specific
payoff.
Indirectly related to this work are works that analyze the
impact of virtual transactions on the overall market efficiency.
Theoretical analysis on the impact of virtual trading was
conducted in [5] and [12] from a game theoretic perspective.
Under a single trading location model, these papers analyzed
the Nash equilibrium (NE) behavior of virtual traders who
have their fixed individual beliefs about the market. Tang
et al. [5] showed that, under NE, if the belief of virtual
traders is correct on average, the price difference between
DA and RT converges to zero as the number of virtual
traders increases. Mather, Bitar, and Poolla [12] presented a
simple learning strategy that guarantee convergence to the
NE. However, convergence to NE doesn’t guarantee price
convergence. Different from the problem of learning the NE in
a game theoretic environment with fixed beliefs [12], we study
the online learning problem of a virtual trader who updates his
belief each day using new observations of DA and RT prices in
order to converge to the optimal trading strategy. Furthermore,
we require that not only the bidding policy converges to the
optimal policy but also the convergence rate is order-optimal.
Among empirical studies, [1] and [6] are the most relevant
to our work. Both evaluate market efficiency before and after
virtual trading was introduced in the electricity markets. More
specifically, in [1], a chance constraint portfolio selection
problem was solved by estimating the distribution of DA-
RT price difference, modeled as Gaussian mixture hidden
Markov model, to determine the trading strategy, whereas,
in [6], hypothesis testing is used to determine the existence
of a profitable trading strategy at each location. Empirical
analysis using CAISO data shows that virtual trading increases
efficiency but the market is still inefficient. Some of the other
interesting empirical studies on the impact of virtual trading
are [7], [13], [14], and [8].
II. VIRTUAL TRADING IN ELECTRICITY MARKETS
A. Virtual Transactions in the Two-Settlement Market System
A virtual transaction on any given day (session) involves
transactions in the DA and RT markets for power at a particular
location and in a particular hour. Herein we refer to each
location-hour pair with which a transaction is associated as
a trading option. Typically, two types of virtual transactions
are allowed in the US wholesale electricity markets: (i) virtual
demand bid and (ii) virtual supply bid. A virtual demand bid
is a bid to buy energy in the DA market with an obligation to
sell back exactly the same amount in the RT market. A virtual
supply bid is a bid to sell energy in the DA market with an
obligation to buy back exactly the same amount in the RT
market.
The DA market takes place one day ahead of the actual
power delivery. In the DA market, the independent system
operator (ISO) receives bids from (actual) generators and load
serving entities as well as virtual bidders. After the DA market
closes on day t− 1, the bids in the DA market are processed
by the ISO via a security constrained economic dispatch that
accepts a subset of virtual bids and determines the amount of
power to generate for each generator and the associated DA
prices.
The RT market takes place at the time of actual power
delivery on day t. The ISO adjusts the dispatch level according
to the actual system operating conditions and compute the RT
prices. The virtual bids that are accepted in the DA market are
settled in the RT market, and a virtual bidder with an accepted
bid is paid at the difference of the DA and RT prices. We give
next a more precise mathematical description of the settlement
process.
B. A Mathematical Model of Virtual Trading
Recall that a trading option is defined by a pair of a location
and a particular time of power delivery. A location can be a
bus of the transmission grid or a trading zone. The time of
power delivery is a specific hour in a 24 hour trading horizon.
Let λt,k and pit,k be the DA and RT prices (in $/MWh) of
option k on day t, respectively. Let xt,k be a virtual bid (in
$/MWh) for option k on day t. A virtual demand bid is a
bid to buy a unit quantity of electricity at a particular location
and hour in the DA market with the obligation to sell the
same amount at the same location and hour in the RT market.
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The demand bid xt,k is cleared if the bid price xt,k is higher
than or equal to the DA price λt,k, i.e., xt,k ≥ λt,k. For the
accepted bid, the payoff is the difference between the RT and
DA prices of that option, i.e.,
(pit,k − λt,k)1{xt,k ≥ λt,k}
where 1{·} is the indicator function that is one if its argument
is true and zero otherwise.
Similarly, a virtual supply bid is an offer to sell electricity
in the DA market with the obligation to buy back in the RT
market. The supply bid xt,k is cleared if the bid price xt,k
is lower than or equal to the market clearing price λt,k, i.e.,
xt,k ≤ λt,k. For the accepted bid, the payoff is given by
(λt,k − pit,k)1{xt,k ≤ λt,k}.
The payoff for the two types of bids can be expressed by a
single expression through a simple translation. To this end, we
assume that DA prices are bounded with known upper/lower
bounds, i.e. lλ < λt,k < uλ. Then, regardless of the type of
bids, the payoff obtained from option k on day t can be written
as:
(pi′t,k − λ′t,k)1{x′t,k ≥ λ′t,k}
where, for a virtual demand bid, x′t,k = xt,k − lλ, λ′t,k =
λt,k − lλ, and pi′t,k = pit,k − lλ; and, for a virtual supply bid,
x′t,k = uλ − xt,k, λ′t,k = uλ − λt,k, and pi′t,k = uλ − pit,k. In
this case, observe that x′t,k = 0 is equivalent to not bidding
for option k on day t.
For notational convenience, hereafter we use λt,k, pit,k, and
xt,k instead of λ′t,k, pi
′
t,k, and x
′
t,k to represent the translated
price and bid variables. The accumulative return for a T-period
trading horizon for a given bid xt,k sequence and DA/RT
prices, irrespective the type of bids, is given by
T∑
t=1
(pit,k − λt,k)1{xt,k ≥ λt,k}. (1)
Next, we study the problem of a virtual trader who considers
to bid on K options and aims to determine the optimal value of
xt,k for each k ∈ {1, ...,K} under a budget constraint. Note
that a trader can submit multiple bids for the same option,
including demand and supply bids, simultaneously.
III. ONLINE LEARNING APPROACH TO VIRTUAL TRADING
In this section, we develop an algorithmic bidding strategy
aimed at maximizing expected payoff by allocating a fixed
budget among K options without assuming the knowledge of
underlying joint distribution of the DA and RT prices.
An outline of our proposed approach is in order. Since the
expected payoff cannot be calculated analytically due to the
unknown distribution, we consider the maximization of the
sample mean payoff, which is equivalent to an empirical risk
minimization (ERM) problem [15]. For fixed trading horizon
T , solving this ERM amounts to solving a multiple-choice
knapsack problem [16], which is NP hard. We propose a
polynomial-time approximation algorithm, referred to as dy-
namic programming on discrete set (DPDS) that converges to
the optimal bidding strategy as the number of trading sessions
increases. More importantly, the DPDS is order optimal in
terms of its rate of convergence as shown in Sec.III-E. We also
extend this algorithm to deal with the objective of optimizing
a variant of mean-variance measure.
A. Problem Formulation
Let λt = [λt,1, ..., λt,K ]ᵀ and pit = [pit,1, ..., pit,K ]ᵀ be
the vector of DA and RT prices on day t, respectively.
Similarly, let xt = [xt,1, ..., xt,K ]ᵀ be the vector of bids
for day t. At the end of each day, the DA and RT prices
of all options are observed. Therefore, before choosing the
bid for day t, all the information the virtual trader has is a
vector2 It−1 containing his observation and decision history
{xi, λi, pii}t−1i=1 . Consequently, a bidding policy µ is defined as
a sequence of decision rules, i.e., µ = (µ0, µ1..., µT−1), such
that, at time t− 1, µt−1 maps the information history It−1 to
the bid xt of day t.
The objective is to determine a bidding policy µ that
maximizes the expected cumulative payoff over T days subject
to a budget constraint for each individual day. From (1), the
optimization problem can be written as
maximize
µ
E
(
T∑
t=1
(pit − λt)ᵀ1{xµt ≥ λt}
)
(2)
subject to ‖xµt ‖1 ≤ B, ∀t = 1, ..., T,
xµt ≥ 0, ∀t = 1, ..., T,
where xµt is the (translated) bid determined by policy µ,
1{xµt ≥ λt} the vector of indicator functions with the kth
entry corresponding to 1{xµt,k ≥ λt,k}, and B the auction
budget3 of the virtual trader. The expectation is taken with
respect to randomness in {pit, λt}Tt=1 and policy µ.
The joint distribution of the DA and RT prices is unknown
to the virtual trader. Hence, it is not possible to solve the
optimization problem analytically. Even if the joint distribution
was known, the above optimization can be non-convex, and
obtaining global optimal policy is nontrivial. Instead, virtual
trader uses his observation history to obtain the optimal bid.
B. An ERM approach
Because past DA and RT prices are observable, one can
calculate the (empirical) average payoff that could have been
obtained up to the current day by a fixed bid x ∈ F where
F = {x ∈ <K : x ≥ 0, ‖x‖1 ≤ B} is the feasible set of bids.
Specifically, the average payoff r¯t,k(xk) from option k with
fixed bid xk in t trading sessions is
r¯t,k(xk) =
1
t
t∑
i=1
(pii,k − λi,k)1{xk ≥ λi,k}.
2In practice, the bid for day t needs to be chosen before observing the
full vector of RT prices of day t − 1. However, in that case, It−1 =
{xi, λi, pii}t−2i=1 can be used instead without loss of generality.
3This budget provides an upper bound to DA market spending in the case of
demand bids only and non-negative DA prices. However, it becomes artificial
with the inclusion of supply bids. In the general setting, the budget constraint
restricts the number of options to bid and leads to the determination of bid
values that provides the best payoff per unit of bid.
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Fig. 1. Example of a piece-wise constant average payoff function of option
k when t = 4.
Note that r¯t,k(xk) is a piece-wise constant function with
at most t breakpoints, each corresponding to a new DA price
observed in the past t periods. Let the vector of order statistics
of the observed DA prices {λi,k}ti=1 be λ(t,k) as illustrated
in Fig. 1 (for t = 4). Let r(t,k) be the associated vector of
average payoffs where r(t,k)j is the average payoff r¯t,k(λ
(t,k)
j )
for fixed bid λ(t,k)j . Then, r¯t,k(xk) can be expressed by the
pair
(
λ(t,k), r(t,k)
)
as shown in Fig. 1.
The overall average payoff function r¯t(x) is the sum of
average payoff functions of individual options. Now, let’s
consider the maximization of r¯t(x),
max
x∈F
r¯t(x) = max
x∈F
K∑
k=1
r¯t,k(xk). (3)
The above ERM problem in (3), unfortunately, is NP-hard.
This result can be obtained by showing that, due to the
piece-wise constant structure of the average payoff function,
solving (3) is equivalent to solving a multiple-choice knap-
sack problem (MCKP), which is known to be NP-hard (see
Appendix A).
C. DPDS: A Polynomial-Time Online Learning Algorithm
We now derive a polynomial-time algorithm referred to
as dynamic programming on discrete set (DPDS). The idea
behind DPDS is to discretize the feasible set using intervals
of equal length and optimize the average payoff on this new
discrete set via a dynamic program.
Let αt be an integer sequence increasing with t, and
Dt = {0, B/αt, 2B/αt, ..., B} is a sequence of equally placed
grid points in [0, B] with increasing density wtih t. Then, the
new discrete set is given as Ft = {x ∈ F : xk ∈ Dt,∀k ∈
{1, ...,K}}. Our goal is to optimize r¯t(.) on the new set Ft
rather than F , i.e.,
max
xt+1∈Ft
r¯t(xt+1) = max
xt+1∈Ft
K∑
k=1
r¯t,k(xt+1,k). (4)
Observe that, for fixed t, this can be written as a multistage
decision problem with K stages as follows: the state of stage
k is the remaining budget bk ∈ Dt, and the action (decision)
of stage k is the bid value xt+1,k ∈ At,bk of option k where
At,bk = {xk ∈ Dt : xk ≤ bk}. In this case, Dt is the state
space, At,bk the action space of stage k, and r¯t,k(xt+1,k) the
payoff (reward) of stage k for taking action xt+1,k.
Now, we define the maximum payoff one can collect in state
b over the remaining n stages as Vn(b). Then, the Bellman
equation can be used to solve for VK(B) which gives the
optimal solution to (4). This type of dynamic programming
approach has been used to solve 0-1 Knapsack problems in-
cluding MCKP [17]. However, that approach results in pseudo-
polynomial computational complexity in the case of 0-1 Knap-
sack problems. The discretization of the feasible set with
equal interval length reduces the computational complexity to
polynomial time. More specifically, the total computational
complexity of DPDS is O(K max(t, α2t )) at each day t t (see
Appendix B for detailed analysis).
D. Risk-Averse Learning
Maximizing expected profit is not necessarily a prudent
strategy in algorithmic bidding. Often the risk of a particular
strategy needs to be taken into account. A commonly used
metric to measure the effectiveness of a strategy is the Sharpe
ratio, which is the ratio of the expected return and the standard
deviation of the return. In essence, this requires a trade-off
between maximizing the expected return and minimizing the
variance.
In order to distribute the budget among the options with high
payoff and low variance, we extend DPDS algorithm to the
optimization of sum of sample mean-variance of all options
(a variant of the well known mean-variance strategy [18]). Let
νi,k denotes (pii,k−λi,k). The sample mean-variance function
for option k can be written as
r¯
(ρ)
t,k (xk) = r¯t,k(xk)
− ρ
t− 1
t∑
i=1
(νi,k1{xk ≥ λi,k} − r¯t,k(xk))2
= r¯t,k(xk) + ρ
t
t− 1 r¯t,k(xk)
2
− ρ t
t− 1
(
1
t
t∑
i=1
ν2i,k1{xk ≥ λi,k}
)
. (5)
In the last equality, observe that r¯(ρ)t,k (xk) is also a piece-
wise constant function with the same breakpoints as r¯t,k(xk).
So, the extension of DPDS follows from using r¯(ρ)t,k (xt) instead
of r¯t,k(xk) while solving the Bellman equation. The value of
r¯
(ρ)
t,k (xk) can be obtained by additionaly updating the value of
the last term in (5). This update is similar to r¯t,k(xk) update.
(See the algorithm pseudo-code given in Fig. 6.)
E. Order Optimality of DPDS
We present a performance analysis of DPDS in this section.
Our results are of two types. First is to show that DPDS
converges to the globally optimal bidding strategy as the
trading horizon T → ∞. The second is to show that the rate
of convergence of DPDS is order-optimal up to a
√
log(T )
factor. This result shows that DPDS has a strong convergence
property over finite trading horizons.
Observe that r¯(ρ)t,k (xk) = r¯t,k(xk) when ρ = 0. Here, we
present our analysis for the sum of mean-variance case (for
any choice of ρ ≥ 0) that includes the expected return (ρ = 0)
as a special case.
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For performance analysis, it is necessary to make several as-
sumptions. These assumptions do not limit the implementation
of the algorithm; they are necessary to make the performance
guarantee of DPDS precise. The assumptions, (A1), (A2), and
(A3) that are used for performance analysis are given below.
(A1). The DA and RT prices (λt, pit) are drawn indepen-
dently4 and identically5 over time t from an unknown joint
distribution f(λt, pit).
(A2). The payoff resulting from bidding on any node k ∈
{1, ...,K} is a bounded random variable with support in [l, u]
for any x ∈ F , i.e. l ≤ (pit,k − λt,k)1{xk ≥ λt,k} ≤ u.
Recall that νt,k denotes (pit,k − λt,k). Define the expected
payoff at day t of node k given the bid xt,k as
rk(xt,k) = E(νt,k1{xt,k ≥ λt,k}|xt,k),
and the variance of the payoff of node k given the bid xt,k as
vk(xt,k) = E
(
(νt,k1{xt,k ≥ λt,k} − rk(xt,k))2|xt,k
)
.
Then, the sum of mean-variance of all nodes will be given by
r(ρ)(xt) =
K∑
k=1
(rk(xt,k)− ρvk(xt,k)).
(A3). r(ρ)(.) is Lipschitz continuous on F with p-norm and
Lipschitz constant L.
Observe that if DA and RT prices have a bounded support
and the distribution f(λt, pit) is uniformly continuous and
uniformly bounded on the union of that support and the
feasible set F , then assumptions (A2) and (A3) are satisfied.
For ρ ≥ 0, the problem of the virtual trader is to find a
bidding policy µ such that
max
µ: xµt ∈ F ∀ t
E
(
T∑
t=1
r(ρ)(xµt )
)
, (6)
which is equivalent to (2) when ρ = 0. Due to (A1), optimal
solution to (6) under known distribution of (pit, λt) does not
depend on t and is given by
x∗ = arg max
x∈F
r(ρ)(x).
Following the online machine learning literature, we mea-
sure the performance of any bidding policy µ by its regret
RµT (f), defined by the difference between the total expected
payoff of policy µ and that of the optimal solution x∗, i.e.,
RµT (f) =
T∑
t=1
E
(
r(ρ)(x∗)− r(ρ)(xµt )
)
.
By definition, the regret is monotonically increasing for any
policy µ and grows linearly with T for the worst possible µ.
Since we define optimality as maximizing the expected payoff,
4For a similar assumption, see Jha and Wolak [6], who showed that one
cannot reject the hypothesis that the autocorrelation matrices of DA-RT price
differences beyond first leg are zero. Hence, the assumption is reasonable due
to prices of day t− 1 being unobservable before bidding for day t in reality.
5This implies that the DA price is independent of xt, which is reasonable
for any market where an individual has negligible impact on the market price.
observe that a policy µ converges to the optimal solution if
the incremental regret E
(
r(ρ)(x∗)− r(ρ)(xµt )
)
goes to zero as
t→∞.
Theorem 1 below shows that the expected payoff of DPDS
converges to the expected payoff of the optimal solution x∗.
More precisely, it characterizes the rate of convergence and
the regret growth rate of DPDS.
Theorem 1. Let xDPDSt+1 denote the bid of DPDS policy for day
t+ 1. Let DPDS parameter choice αt = max(dαtγe, 2) with
γ ≥ 1/2 and α > 0, and let (A1), (A2), and (A3) hold. Then,
for t ≥ 2,
E(r(ρ)(x∗)− r(ρ)(xDPDSt+1)) ≤ C1
√
log t/t+ C2t
−1/2
and for T > 1,
RDPDST (f) ≤ C
√
T log T ,
where C = 2(C1 +C2) and C1 and C2 are positive constants
which depend on the values of K, L, p, B, u, l, ρ, α, and γ.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Theorem 1 is proved by showing that the expected payoff
of x∗t+1 = arg maxx∈Ft r
(ρ)(x) converges to that of x∗ due
to Lipschitz continuity, and the expected payoff of xDPDSt+1 con-
verges to that of x∗t+1 via the use of McDiarmid’s inequality.
Theorem 2 shows that the regret of any policy is lower
bounded by Ω(
√
T ). This result implies that the convergence
rate of the expected payoff for any policy cannot be faster than
Ω(1/
√
t) because, otherwise, the regret growth would have
been slower than Ω(
√
T ). Hence, DPDS achieves the order-
optimal convergence as well as the slowest possible regret
growth rate up to a logarithmic factor.
Theorem 2. Consider the case where K = 1, B = 1,
ρ = 0. For any bidding policy µ, there exists a distribution f
satisfying assumptions (A1), (A2), and (A3) such that
RµT (f) ≥
1
16
√
5
√
T .
Proof. See Appendix D.
The proof of Theorem 2 is derived by showing that, every
time the bid is cleared, an incremental regret greater than
T−1/2/(4
√
5) is incurred under a distribution; otherwise, it
is incurred under another distribution. However, to distinguish
between these two distributions, one needs Ω(T ) samples
which results in a regret lower bound given in Theorem 2.
IV. EMPIRICAL STUDY
A. Setup and Data
For the empirical study, we consider virtual bids on zonal
nodes for two different ISOs: NYISO and PJM. We use
historical DA and RT price data from the beginning of 2006
until the end of 2016 of NYISO and PJM zones. This data
set is available for all 11 zones of NYISO and for 19 zones
of PJM. Since the price varies in time and location, there are
N × 24 different trading options every day where N = 11 for
NYISO and N = 19 for PJM. The prices are per unit (MWh)
prices. We consider virtual demand and virtual supply bids
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 14, NO. 8, AUGUST 2015 6
simultaneously for all options by using the model presented
in Sec. II-B. This model requires the knowledge of an upper
bound uλ and a lower bound lλ for DA price. We choose uλ
and lλ accordingly for each ISO by looking at the range of the
historical DA prices in that markets. We set uλ = 1000 and
lλ = 0 for NYISO; and uλ = 1050 and lλ = −30 for PJM.
Consequently, total number of options is K = 2×N × 24.
The DA market for day t closes early in the morning on day
t − 1 for both NYISO and PJM. Hence, all of the RT prices
of day t − 1 cannot be observed before the bid submission
for day t. Therefore, the most recent observation used for any
algorithm was from day t− 2 to determine the bid for day t.
B. Benchmark Methods
We compare DPDS with three algorithms. One is UCBID-
GR inspired by UCBID [10]. On each day, UCBID-GR sorts
all trading options according to their profitabilities, i.e., their
historical average DA-RT price spreads. Then, starting from
the most profitable option, it sets the bid for an option equal to
its historical average RT price6 until there isn’t any sufficient
budget left.
The second algorithm is a variant of Kiefer-Wolfowitz
stochastic approximation method, herein referred to as SA. SA
approximates the gradient of the payoff function by using the
current observation and updates the bid of each k as follows;
xt+1,k = xt,k + at(pit−1,k − λt−1,k)∇ˆt,k
where
∇ˆt,k = 1{xt,k + ct ≥ λt−1,k} − 1{xt,k − ct,k ≥ λt−1,k}
ct
.
Then, xt+1 is projected to the feasible set F . The step size
at and ct of SA were determined by searching for values that
provide relatively better payoff and were set as 20000/(t− 1)
and 2000/(t− 1)0.25, respectively.
The last algorithm is SVM-GR, which is inspired by the
use of support vector machines (SVM) by Tang et al. [19]
to determine if a demand or a supply bid is profitable for an
option, i.e., if the price spread is positive or negative. Due
to possible correlation of a particular option’s price spread
on any given day with the price spreads of that and also of
other options that are observed recently, for day t, the input of
SVM for each option is set as the price spreads of all options
from day t− 7 to day t− 2. To test SVM-GR algorithm at a
particular year, for each option, the data from the previous year
is used to train SVM and to determine the average profit, i.e.,
average price spread, and the bid level that will be accepted
with 95% confidence in the event that a demand or a supply
bid is profitable. For the test year, on each day, SVM-GR first
determines if a demand or a supply bid is profitable for each
option. Then, SVM-GR sorts all options according to their
average profits, and, starting from the most profitable option,
it sets the bid of an option equal to the bid level with 95%
confidence of acceptance until there isn’t any sufficient budget
left.
6The bid is set to zero if historical average RT price is negative because
bidding less than or equal to zero implies not bidding on that option.
Fig. 2. Cumulative profit trajectory from 2012 to 2016 in NYISO for
B=$250,000 after an initial training with 2011 data.
The DPDS algorithm was tested for ρ values of 0 and 0.002
to evaluate the performance under a sum of mean-variance
objective instance as well as for ρ = 0 (the risk-neutral
objective). To differentiate between these two different choices
of ρ, let DPDS(ρ) denote the DPDS algorithm with associated
ρ value. The DPDS algorithm parameter αt was set to be t−1.
C. Empirical Results/Analysis
For each algorithm, the trajectory of cumulative profit
that was obtained in NYISO market with a daily budget of
B=$250,000 from the beginning of 2012 until the end of 2016
is given in Fig. 2. Since the data of 2011 was required to
train SVM-GR, other algorithms were also trained starting
from the beginning of 2011. First, we observed that DPDS
significantly outperformed other algorithms in terms of Sharpe
ratio7, including the S&P 500 Sharpe ratio8 of 2.10 for the
same period. See the legend of Fig. 2. This showed the
significant value of participating in virtual trading in terms
of profitability and risk trade-off.
The cumulative profit of DPFS, as shown in Fig. 2, outper-
formed all other algorithms with DPDS(0), which generated
the highest profit. Comparing DPDS(0) and DPDS(0.002) with
the latter taking into account the variance of the return, we
observed from Fig. 2 that DPDS(0.002) generated a smoother
return trajectory by avoiding more risky bids and generating
less profit. We observed that, even though other algorithms
were profitable; the increase in their cumulative profits was not
consistent. Particularly, for UCBID-GR and SVM-GR, most of
their profit resulted from a jump occurred in January 2014 due
to a polar vortex [20], which didn’t affect SA because of SA’s
incremental bid update via a local search.
To gain insights from the performance of these algorithms
on a yearly basis, annual performances for 10 consecutive
years in NYISO market and in PJM market are provided in
Fig. 3 and in Fig. 4, respectively. To evaluate the performance
of a given year, SVM-GR used the data from the previous
year for training. Hence, all other algorithms were trained
7In this paper, Sharpe ratio is calculated as
√
T r¯T√
1
T−1
∑T
t=1(rt−r¯T )2
where r¯T = 1T
∑T
t=1 rt, T is the number of trading days during the time
period under consideration, and rt is the percentage return of day t, which
is equal to the profit of day t for virtual trading with fixed daily budget.
8To calculate this, S&P 500 adjusted closing price data for the time period
under consideration is used. This data is obtained from Yahoo finance.
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(a) Annual profit versus year (b) Annual Sharpe ratio versus year
Fig. 3. Annual performance in NYISO for B = $250, 000 (For each year, an initial training with previous year’s data was performed.)
(a) Annual profit versus year (b) Annual Sharpe ratio versus year
Fig. 4. Annual performance in PJM for B = $250, 000 (For each year, an initial training with previous year’s data was performed.)
(a) 2016 profit versus budget level (b) 2016 Sharpe ratio versus budget level
Fig. 5. 2016 Performance in NYISO under different budget levels after an initial training with 2014 and 2015 data
for each year starting from the beginning of the previous
year. Fig. 3(a) illustrates the total profit that is obtained each
year in NYISO. We observed that DPDS outperformed all
other algorithms almost every year and consistently achieved
a positive profit each year for both ρ values; whereas, all other
algorithms incurred losses frequently. Due to the increasing
trend in profits from 2009 to 2014, we couldn’t conclude
that there was a decrease in profits over the years as a
result of price convergence despite the decrease in the last
two years. In NYISO, 2016 seemed to be the worst year
in terms of profitability in general. Annual Sharpe ratios of
all algorithms along with that of S&P 500 are illustrated in
Fig. 3(b) for NYISO. We observed that DPDS outperformed
other algorithms and S&P 500 also in terms of Sharpe ratio.
Similarly, total profit and Sharpe ratios that were achieved
each year in the PJM market are provided in Fig. 4(a) and
Fig. 4(b), respectively. In PJM, we observed that the trends
in terms of both profit and Sharpe ratio were similar to the
ones observed in NYISO. In general, we observed that the
profit margins of all algorithms except SVM-GR were much
higher in PJM compared with NYISO. Similar to the case in
NYISO, in PJM, DPDS achieved higher Sharpe ratios than
any other algorithm and than S&P 500. However, in PJM, the
performance gap between DPDS and others was much more
significant. Furthermore, the Sharpe ratios were in general
higher for all algorithms (except SVM-GR) in PJM compared
with NYISO counterparts. In PJM, especially DPDS exhibited
very high Sharpe ratios, i.e., between 2 and 9, which were
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consistently higher for ρ = 0.002 (around 5 on average)
compared with ρ = 0 (around 3.6 on average).
To illustrate how algorithms performed under different
budget constraints, we examined the NYISO market in 2016,
the year with the lowest levels of profit and Sharpe ratio (see
Fig. 3). Total profit and Sharpe ratio for this period under
different budget levels are illustrated in Fig 5(a) and Fig 5(b),
respectively. Here, all algorithms were trained initially with
the data from the previous two years rather than only previous
year. When we increased the data used for initial training to
two years, we observed that algorithms performed significantly
better in terms of both profit and Sharpe ratio in general.
We observed that DPDS outperformed other algorithms at all
budget levels, and profit of DPDS(0) increased with increasing
budget; whereas the profit of DPDS(0.002) stayed in the
same range without an increasing trend. This was reasonable
because DPDS(0) optimized profit and should exhibit a profit
increase for higher budgets; whereas DPDS(0.002) optimized
a linear combination of profit and variance term, which did
not indicate a profit increase. SVM-GR also illustrated an
increasing trend in profit, but this trend was much smaller
compared with the trend of DPDS(0). For both SA and
UCBID-GR, big losses were observed almost at all budget
levels. In Fig. 5(b), we observed that DPDS achieved higher
Sharpe ratios than other algorithms for both ρ values, and
the Sharpe ratio of DPDS(0) stayed around the Sharpe ratio
of S&P 500; whereas DPDS(0.002) achieved higher Sharpe
ratio than DPDS(0) consistently. So, even though the profit
levels of 2016 were not as high as the ones that were obtained
in previous years, there were bidding strategies that achieved
better Sharpe ratio than that of S&P 500.
V. CONCLUSION
In many wholesale electricity markets, virtual trading is al-
lowed across different locations in the grid and across different
hours of the day. For example, PJM allows virtual demand
and virtual supply bids on more than 1000 locations. Hence,
rather than considering to bid on a specific location (or a
specific zone where the price is averaged over many locations),
we show that a well-designed online learning algorithm can
assess many virtual bidding options simultaneously and select
the most profitable ones among them efficiently. Despite that
the objective function involved being non-convex and the
ERM problem being NP-hard, the proposed polynomial-time
algorithm provides an approximate solution that converges to
the optimal solution with the fastest rate of convergence.
More significant, perhaps, is that the proposed algorithm,
when tested with multi-year historical data, showed better
Sharpe ratio against competitors, including the S&P 500
index. Such historical data, obviously, do not confirm with the
assumption made for the convergence result. This suggests a
level of robustness of the proposed algorithm.
There are several directions that the proposed approach can
be generalized. The algorithm presented here optimizes the bid
values (willingness to pay) for options but not the quantities
(number of MWhs). Even though the problem formulation
allows optimization of multiple copies of the same option as
separate options, this is not efficient in terms of computational
complexity. An extension to include quantity as a decision
variable should further improve the performance. It would
be also interesting to study other risk-averse objectives. For
example, including the bid values as well as bid quantities as
decision variables to the risk-constrained problem formulation
in [1] can be considered.
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APPENDIX A
NP-HARDNESS OF THE ERM APPROACH
Due to the piece-wise constant structure, choosing xk =
λ
(t,k)
i for some i contributes the same amount to the over-
all payoff as choosing any xk ∈
[
λ
(t,k)
i , λ
(t,k)
i+1
)
. However,
choosing xk = λ
(t,k)
i utilizes a smaller portion of the budget.
Hence, an optimal solution to (3) can be obtained by solving
the following integer linear program:
maximize
{zk}Kk=1
K∑
k=1
(
r(t,k)
)ᵀ
zk
subject to
K∑
k=1
(
λ(t,k)
)ᵀ
zk ≤ B, (7)
‖zk‖1 ≤ 1, ∀k,
zk,i ∈ {0, 1}, ∀(k, i).
where the bid value xk =
(
λ(t,k)
)ᵀ
zk for node k.
Observe that (7) is a multiple choice knapsack problem
(MCKP), a generalization of the 0-1 knapsack. The MCKP
problem in (7), unfortunately, is NP-hard [16]. Had we
a polynomial-time algorithm that finds an optimal solution
x ∈ F to (3), we would have obtained the solution of
(7) in polynomial-time by setting zk,i = 1 where i =
max
i:λ
(t,k)
i ≤xk
i for each k. By contradiction, the ERM prob-
lem (3) is also NP-hard.
APPENDIX B
THE BELLMAN EQUATION AND COMPUTATIONAL
COMPLEXITY OF DPDS
Recall that Vn(b) is defined as the maximum payoff one can
collect in state b over the remaining n stages. Assuming that
V0(b) = 0 for any b, the Bellman equation can be written as
VK−k+1(b) = max
xk∈At,b
(r¯t,k(xk) + VK−k(b− xk)) , (8)
which can be solved via backward induction starting from k =
K and proceeding toward k = 1. For each k, VK−k+1(b) is
calculated for all b ∈ Dt. Since the computation of VK−k+1(b)
requires at most αt + 1 comparison for any fixed value of
k ∈ {1, ...,K} and b ∈ Dt, it has a computational complexity
on the order of Kα2t given the average payoff values r¯t,k(xk)
for all xk ∈ Dt and k ∈ {1, ...,K}. For each k ∈ {1, ...,K},
computation of r¯t,k(xn) for all xk ∈ Dt introduces an
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additional computational complexity of at most on the order
of t which can be achieved by updating
(
λ(t,k), r(t,k)
)
from(
λ(t−1,k), r(t−1,k)
)
recursively by using observations λt and
pit (see the algorithm pseudo-code provided in Fig. 6). Hence,
total computational complexity of DPDS is O(K max(t, α2t ))
at each day t.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Recall that x∗ = arg maxx∈F r
(ρ)(x) and let x∗t+1 =
arg maxx∈Ft r
(ρ)(x). Hence, for any x′ ∈ Ft,
r(ρ)(x∗)− r(ρ)(x∗t+1) ≤ r(ρ)(x∗)− r(ρ)(x′).
We take x′k = bx∗k/(B/αt)c(B/αt) for all k ∈ {1, ...,K},
where bx∗k/(B/αt)c denotes the largest integer smaller or
equal to x∗k/(B/αt), so that x
′ ∈ Ft and |x′k − x∗k| ≤ B/αt
for all k ∈ {1, ...,K}. Then, due to Lipschitz continuity of
r(ρ)(.) on F with p-norm and constant L,
r(ρ)(x∗)− r(ρ)(x∗t+1) ≤ LK1/pB/αt. (9)
Since the payoff obtained at each period t from bidding
on a node k ∈ {1, ...,K} is in [l, u] and r(ρ)(.) is Lip-
schitz, r(ρ)(x∗t+1) − r(ρ)(x) ≤ c1 for any x ∈ Ft where
c1 = min
(
c2, LK
1/pB
)
and c2 = K
(
(u− l) + ρ(u− l)2).
Then, for any δt > 0,
r(ρ)(x∗t+1)− r(ρ)(xDPDSt+1)
=
∑
x∈Ft
(
r(ρ)(x∗t+1)− r(ρ)(x)
)
1
{
xDPDSt+1 = x
}
≤ δt
∑
x∈Ft:r(ρ)(x∗t+1)−r(ρ)(x)≤δt
1
{
xDPDSt+1 = x
}
+ c1
∑
x∈Ft:r(ρ)(x∗t+1)−r(ρ)(x)>δt
1
{
xDPDSt+1 = x
}
≤ δt + c1
∑
x∈Ft:r(ρ)(x∗t+1)−r(ρ)(x)>δt
1
{
xDPDSt+1 = x
}
where the last inequality is obtained by the fact that at most
one of the indicator functions can be equal to one due to the
events being disjoint.
Since DPDS chooses x ∈ Ft that maximizes r¯(ρ)t (x) =∑K
k=1 r¯
(ρ)
t,k (xk), r¯
(ρ)
t (x) ≥ r¯(ρ)t (x∗t+1) has to hold for any x ∈
Ft if xDPDSt+1 = x. Hence, we can upper bound the last inequality
obtained to get
r(ρ)(x∗t+1)− r(ρ)(xDPDSt+1)
≤ δt + c1
∑
x∈Ft:r(ρ)(x∗t+1)−r(ρ)(x)>δt
1{r¯(ρ)t (x) ≥ r¯(ρ)t (x∗t+1)}.
In order for r¯(ρ)t (x) ≥ r¯(ρ)t (x∗t+1) to hold for any x ∈ Ft
satisfying r(ρ)(x∗t+1)− r(ρ)(x) > δt, observe that the event
E1 =
{
r¯
(ρ)
t (x
∗
t+1) + δt/2 ≤ r(ρ)(x∗t+1)
}
holds and/or the event
E2 =
{
r(ρ)(x) + δt/2 ≤ r¯(ρ)t (x)
}
1: Initialization: Set x1 = 0 and
(
λ(k), r(k), v(k)
)
= (0, 0)
∀ k ∈ {1, ...,K};
2: for t = 1 to T do
3: Bid xt;
4: At the end of period t, observe (λt, pit);
5: for k = 1 to K do
6: Set ik = maxi:λ(k)i <λt,k
i;
7: λ(k) =
[
λ
(k)
1:ik
, λt,k, λ
(k)
ik+1:t
]ᵀ
;
8: r(k) =
[
t−1
t r
(k)
1:ik
, t−1t r
(k)
ik:t
+ 1t (pit,k − λt,k)
]ᵀ
;
9: v(k) =
[
t−1
t v
(k)
1:ik
, t−1t v
(k)
ik:t
+ 1t (pit,k − λt,k)2
]ᵀ
;
10: end for
11: Set V0(jB/αt) = 0 ∀ j ∈ {0, 1, ..., αt};
12: Set Vn(0) = 0 ∀ n ∈ {1, ...,K};
13: Set wn(0) = 0 ∀ n ∈ {1, ...,K};
14: for n = 1 to K do
15: l = 2, d = 0, and j′ = αt;
16: for j = 1 to αt do
17: while d = 0 do
18: if λ(n)l > jB/αt then
19: rˆt,n (jB/αt) = r
(n)
l−1+ρ
t
t−1 [(r
(n)
l−1)
2−
v
(n)
l−1];
20: break;
21: else
22: if l = t+ 1 then
23: rˆt,n (jB/αt) = r
(n)
l +
ρ tt−1 [(r
(n)
l )
2 − v(n)l ];
24: d = 1 and j′ = j;
25: break;
26: else
27: l = l + 1;
28: end if
29: end if
30: end while
31: Vn(jB/αt) = Vn−1(jB/αt);
32: wn(jB/αt) = 0;
33: for i = 1 to min{j, j′} do
34: if Vn(jB/αt) < Vn−1((j − i)B/αt) +
rˆt,n(iB/αt) then
35: Vn(jB/αt) = Vn−1((j − i)B/αt) +
rˆt,n(iB/αt);
36: wn(jB/αt) = iB/αt;
37: end if
38: end for
39: end for
40: end for
41: Br = B;
42: for k = K to 1 do
43: xt+1,k = wk(Br);
44: Br = Br − xt+1,k;
45: end for
46: end for
Fig. 6. DPDS algorithm pseudo-code. Here, for a vector y, ym:n =
(ym, ym+1, ..., yn) denotes the sequence of entries from m to n.
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holds. Consequently,
E
(
r(ρ)(x∗t+1)− r(ρ)(xDPDSt+1)
)
≤ δt + c1
∑
x∈Ft:r(ρ)(x∗t+1)−r(ρ)(x)>δt
Pr (E1 ∪ E2) .
Also, observe that, for any fixed x ∈ F , E
(
r¯
(ρ)
t (x)
∣∣∣x) =
r(ρ)(x). So, we can use McDiarmid’s inequality [21] to upper
bound both Pr(E1) and Pr(E2) if we show that r¯(ρ)t (x) for
fixed x ∈ Ft satisfies the bounded differences condition as a
function of {(λi, pii)}ti=1 ∈ Πt where Π denotes the support
of the random variable (λi, pii).
Recall that νi,k denotes (pii,k − λi,k). Define r¯(−j)t (x) =∑K
k=1 r¯
(−j)
t,k (xk) where
r¯
(−j)
t,k (xk) =
1
t− 1
∑
i:i6=j,1≤i≤t
νi,k1{xk ≥ λi,k},
and define v¯(−j)t (x) =
∑K
k=1 v¯
(−j)
t,k (xk) where
v¯
(−j)
t,k (xk)
=
1
t− 1
∑
i:i 6=j,1≤i≤t
(
νi,k1{xk ≥ λi,k} − r¯(−j)t,k (xk)
)2
.
Then, for any j ∈ {1, ..., t}, we can express r¯(ρ)t (x) as follows:
r¯
(ρ)
t (x) = h
(−j)
t (x) +
1
t
K∑
k=1
νj,k1{xk ≥ λj,k}
− ρ
t
K∑
k=1
(
νj,k1{xk ≥ λj,k} − r¯(−j)t,k (xk)
)2
where
h
(−j)
t (x) =
t− 1
t
r¯
(−j)
t (x)− ρv¯(−j)t (x)
doesn’t depend on (λj , pij). We also define r¯
(ρ,j′)
t (x) as
r¯
(ρ,j′)
t (x) = h
(−j)
t (x) +
1
t
K∑
k=1
νj′,k1{xk ≥ λj′,k}
− ρ
t
K∑
k=1
(
νj′,k1{xk ≥ λj′,k} − r¯(−j)t,k (xk)
)2
.
Recall that, for any (λi, pii) ∈ Π, x ∈ F and k ∈
{1, ..,K}, l ≤ νi,k1{xk ≥ λi,k} ≤ u. Therefore, for
any j ∈ {1, ..., t} and x ∈ F , r¯(ρ)t (x), r¯(ρ,j
′)
t (x) ∈[
h
(−j)
t (x) +K(l − ρ(u− l)2)/t, h(−j)t (x) +Ku/t
]
for any
{(λi, pii)}ti=1 , (λj′ , pij′) ∈ Πt+1. Hence, for any x ∈ F and
j ∈ {1, ..., t},
sup
{(λi,pii)}ti=1,(λj′ ,pij′ )∈Πt+1
∣∣∣r¯(ρ)t (x)− r¯(ρ)(j′)t (x)∣∣∣ ≤ c2t .
Since bounded differences condition holds, by McDiarmid’s
inequality, both Pr(E1) and Pr(E2) are upper bounded by
exp
(−tδ2t / (2c22)). Using the fact that the cardinality of the
set
{
x ∈ Ft : r(ρ)(x∗t+1)− r(ρ)(x) > δt
}
is upper bounded by
αKt +K ≤ 2αKt for αt ≥ 2 and Pr(E1∪E2) ≤ Pr(E1)+Pr(E2),
we get
E
(
r(ρ)(x∗t+1)− r(ρ)(xDPDSt+1)
)
≤ δt + 4c1αKt exp
(
− tδ
2
t
2c22
)
.
(10)
By setting δt = c2
√
2(γ + 1)K + 1
√
log t/t and αt =
max(dαtγe, 2) with γ ≥ 1/2 and α > 0, from (9) and (10),
we obtain
E(r(ρ)(x∗)− r(ρ)(xDPDSt+1))
= E(r(ρ)(x∗)− r(ρ)(x∗t+1)) + E(r(ρ)(x∗t+1)− r(ρ)(xDPDSt+1))
≤ LK1/pB/αt + C1
√
log t/t+ 4c1α
K
t t
−(γ+1)K−1/2
≤
(
LK1/pB/α+ 4c1 max
(
t−K/2, ((α+ 1)/t)K
))
t−1/2
+ C1
√
log t/t
≤ C1
√
log t/t+ C2t
−1/2,
where C1 = c2
√
2(γ + 1)K + 1 and C2 = LK1/pB/α +
4c1 max(1, α
K).
For any T ≥ 2, ∑T−1t=1 1/√t ≤ 2√T − 1 − 1 and∑T−1
t=1
√
log t/t ≤ 2√(T − 1) log(T − 1). Hence, for T > 2,
T−1∑
t=2
E
(
r(ρ)(x∗)− r(ρ)(xDPDSt+1)
)
≤ C1
T−1∑
t=1
√
log t
t
+ C2
T−1∑
t=1
1√
t
≤ 2C1
√
(T − 1) log(T − 1) + C2
(
2
√
T − 1− 1
)
.
Since E
(
r(ρ)(x∗)− r(ρ)(xDPDSt )
) ≤ c1, for any T ≥ 1,
RDPDST (f) ≤ 2C1
√
T log T + 2C2
√
T
and for any T > 1,
RDPDST (f) ≤ 2(C1 + C2)
√
T log T .
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Let λt and pit be independent random variables with distri-
butions
fλ(λt) = 
−11{(1− )/2 ≤ λt ≤ (1 + )/2}
and fpi(pit) = Bernoulli(p¯i), respectively. Let f(λt, pit) =
fλ(λt)fpi(pit) and  = T−1/2/2
√
5.
Fix any policy µ. Since λt and pit are independent,
r(0)(x) = E((p¯i − λt)1{x ≥ λt}|x)
and
r(0)(x∗)− r(0)(xµt )
= E((p¯i − λt)(1{x∗ ≥ λt} − 1{xµt ≥ λt})|xµt , x∗) (11)
Let f0, f1, f2 denote the distribution of {λt, pit}Tt=1 and
policy µ under the choice of p¯i = 1/2, p¯i = 1/2 − , and
p¯i = 1/2 + , respectively. Also, let Ei(.) and RµT (fi) denote
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the expectation with respect to the distribution fi and the regret
of policy µ under distribution fi, respectively.
Under distribution f1, observe that p¯i − λt ≤ −/2 for
any value of λt . Therefore, optimal solution under known
distribution x∗ ∈ [0, (1−)/2] so that 1{x∗ ≥ λt} = 0. Then,
by (11), the regret can be expressed as
RµT (f1) = E1
(
T∑
t=1
−(p¯i − λt)1{xµt ≥ λt}
)
≥ 
2
E1
(
T∑
t=1
1{xµt ≥ λt}
)
.
Similarly, under distribution f2, observe that p¯i − λt ≥ /2
for any value of λt . Therefore, optimal solution under known
distribution x∗ ∈ [(1+)/2, 1] so that 1{x∗ ≥ λt} = 1. Then,
by (11), the regret becomes
RµT (f2) = E2
(
T∑
t=1
(p¯i − λt)1{xµt < λt}
)
≥ 
2
E2
(
T∑
t=1
1{xµt < λt}
)
.
For any non-negative bounded function h defined on infor-
mation history IT = {xt, λt, pit}Tt=1 such that 0 ≤ h(IT ) ≤M
for some M ≥ 0 and for any distributions p and q, the differ-
ence between the expected value of h under the distributions p
and q is bounded by a function of the KL-divergence between
these distributions as follows:
Eq(h(IT ))− Ep(h(IT ))
≤
∫
q(IT )>p(IT )
h(IT )(q(IT )− p(IT ))dIT
≤M
∫
q(IT )>p(IT )
q(IT )− p(IT )dIT
= M
1
2
∫
|q(IT )− p(IT )|dIT
≤M
√
KL(q||p)/2. (12)
where KL(q||p) = ∫ q(IT ) log(q(IT )/p(IT ))dIT is the KL-
divergence between q and p and the last inequality is due to
Pinsker’s inequality [22], i.e., V (q, p) ≤√KL(q||p)/2 where
V (q, p) =
∫ |q(IT ) − p(IT )|dIT /2 is the variational distance
between q and p. The bound given in (12) is inspired by a
similar bound obtained by [23] in the proof of Lemma A.1 for
the case of discrete distribution in the context of non-stochastic
multi-armed bandit problem.
Now, since
∑T
t=1 1{xµt ≥ λt} ≤ T and
∑T
t=1 1{xµt <
λt} ≤ T , we use (12) to obtain
RµT (f1) ≥

2
E0
(
T∑
t=1
1{xµt ≥ λt}
)
− 
2
T
√
KL(f0||f1)/2,
and
RµT (f2) ≥

2
E0
(
T∑
t=1
1{xµt < λt}
)
− 
2
T
√
KL(f0||f2)/2.
Consequently,
max
i∈{1,2}
RµT (fi)
≥ 1
2
(RµT (f1) +RµT (f2))
≥ 
4
(
T − T
√
KL(f0||f1)/2− T
√
KL(f0||f2)/2
)
.
(13)
For any i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, we can express the distribution of
observations in terms of conditional distributions as follows;
fi(IT ) =
T∏
t=1
fi(pit, λt|xµt , It−1)fi(xµt |It−1)
=
T∏
t=1
fi(pit)fλ(λt)f(x
µ
t |It−1),
where the second equality is due to the independence of λt
and pit from the past observations It−1, the bid x
µ
t , and from
each other. Also, the distribution of xµt given It−1 does not
depend on i. Consequently, for i ∈ {1, 2},
KL(f0||fi) =
∫
f0(IT ) log
(
T∏
t=1
f0(pit)
fi(pit)
)
dIT
=
T∑
t=1
∫
f0(IT ) log
(
f0(pit)
fi(pit)
)
dIT
=
T∑
t=1
(
1
2
log
(
1/2
1/2 + 
)
+
1
2
log
(
1/2
1/2− 
))
= −(T/2) log (1− 42) .
Then, by (13) and by setting  = T−1/2/2
√
5, we get
max
i∈{1,2}
RµT (fi) ≥
T
4
(
1−
√
−T log (1− 42)
)
=
√
T
8
√
5
(
1−
√
−T log (1− 1/(5T ))
)
≥
√
T
16
√
5
where the last inequality follows from the fact that − log(1−
x) ≤ (5/4)x for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1/5.
Observe that the magnitude of the derivative of r(0)(x) is
equal to |p¯i − x|/ for (1 − )/2 ≤ x ≤ (1 + )/2 and 0
otherwise. So, for distributions f1 and f2, r(0)(x) is Lipschitz
continuous with Lipschitz constant L = 3/2 because |p¯i −
x|/ ≤ 3/2 for (1−)/2 ≤ x ≤ (1+)/2. Hence, assumptions
(A1), (A2), and (A3) are satisfied for both distributions.
REFERENCES
[1] R. Li, A. J. Svoboda, and S. S. Oren, “Efficiency impact of convergence
bidding in the california electricity market,” J. Regul. Econ., vol. 48,
no. 3, pp. 245–284, Dec. 2015.
[2] PJM, “Virtual transactions in the pjm energy markets,” PJM, Audubon,
PA, USA, 2015. [Online]. Available: http://www.pjm.com/∼/media/
library/reports-notices/special-reports/20151012-virtual-bid-report.ashx
[3] J. E. Parsons, C. Colbert, J. Larrieu, T. Martin, and E. Mastrangelo,
“Financial arbitrage and efficient dispatch in wholesale electricity
markets,” MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research
No. 15-002, 2015. [Online]. Available: https://ssrn.com/abstract=
2574397
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 14, NO. 8, AUGUST 2015 12
[4] W. W. Hogan, “Virtual bidding and electricity market design,” Electricity
J., vol. 29, no. 5, pp. 33 – 47, June 2016.
[5] W. Tang, R. Rajagopal, K. Poolla, and P. Varaiya, “Model and data
analysis of two-settlement electricity market with virtual bidding,” in
2016 IEEE 55th Conf. Decision and Control, 2016, pp. 6645–6650.
[6] A. Jha and F. A. Wolak, “Testing for market efficiency with transactions
costs: An application to convergence bidding in wholesale electricity
markets,” 2015. [Online]. Available: http://web.stanford.edu/group/
fwolak/cgi-bin/sites/default/files/CAISO VB draft VNBER final.pdf
[7] C. Saravia, “Speculative trading and market performance: The effect of
arbitrageurs on efficiency and market power in the new york electricity
market,” Center for the Study of Energy Markets, 2003. [Online].
Available: http://escholarship.org/uc/item/0mx44472
[8] T. Guler, G. Gross, E. Litvinov, and R. Coutu, “On the economics of
power system security in multi-settlement electricity markets,” IEEE
Trans. Power Syst., vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 284–295, Feb. 2010.
[9] C. Woo, J. Zarnikau, E. Cutter, S. Ho, and H. Leung, “Virtual bid-
ding, wind generation and california’s day-ahead electricity forward
premium,” Electricity J., vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 29 – 48, Feb. 2015.
[10] J. Weed, V. Perchet, and P. Rigollet, “Online learning in repeated
auctions,” in 29th Annu. Conf. Learning Theory, 2016, pp. 1562–1583.
[11] R. Kleinberg and A. Slivkins, “Sharp dichotomies for regret minimiza-
tion in metric spaces,” in Proc. 21th Annu. ACM-SIAM Symp. Discrete
Algorithms, 2010, pp. 827–846.
[12] J. Mather, E. Bitar, and K. Poolla, “Virtual bidding: Equilibrium,
learning, and the wisdom of crowds,” IFAC-PapersOnLine, vol. 50, no. 1,
pp. 225 – 232, 2017, 20th IFAC World Congress. [Online]. Available:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2405896317300526
[13] S. Borenstein, J. Bushnell, C. R. Knittel, and C. Wolfram, “Inefficien-
cies and market power in financial arbitrage: A study of california’s
electricity markets*,” J. Ind. Econ., vol. 56, no. 2, pp. 347–378, June
2008.
[14] J. Birge, A. Hortacsu, I. Mercadal, and M. Pavlin, “Limits to arbitrage
in electricity markets: A case study of miso,” MIT Center for
Energy and Enviromental Policy Research, 2017. [Online]. Available:
http://ceepr.mit.edu/publications/reprints/656
[15] V. Vapnik, “Principles of risk minimization for learning theory,” in
Advances Neural Inform. Process. Syst. 4, 1992, pp. 831–838.
[16] H. Kellerer, U. Pferschy, and D. Pisinger, “The multiple-choice knapsack
problem,” in Knapsack Problems. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin
Heidelberg, 2004, ch. 11, pp. 317–347.
[17] K. Dudziski and S. Walukiewicz, “Exact methods for the knapsack
problem and its generalizations,” Eur. J. Oper. Res., vol. 28, no. 1, pp.
3 – 21, 1987.
[18] H. Markowitz, “Portfolio selection,” J. Finance, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 77–91,
Mar. 1952.
[19] W. Tang, R. Rajagopal, K. Poolla, and P. Varaiya, “Impact of virtual
bidding on financial and economic efficiency of wholesale electricity
markets,” working paper. [Online]. Available: http://www4.ncsu.edu/
∼wtang8/docs/TaRaPoVa.pdf
[20] D. B. Patton, P. LeeVanSchaick, and J. Chen, “2014 state of the market
report for the new york iso markets,” Tech. Rep., May 2015. [Online].
Available: http://www.nyiso.com/public/webdocs/markets operations/
documents/Studies and Reports/Reports/Market Monitoring Unit
Reports/2014/NYISO2014SOMReport 5-13-2015 Final.pdf
[21] C. McDiarmid, “On the method of bounded differences,” in Surveys in
Combinatorics, 1989: Invited Papers at the Twelfth British Combinato-
rial Conference. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp.
148–188.
[22] A. B. Tsybakov, “Lower bounds on the minimax risk,” in Introduction
to Nonparametric Estimation. New York, NY: Springer New York,
2009, ch. 2, pp. 77–135.
[23] P. Auer, N. Cesa-Bianchi, Y. Freund, and R. E. Schapire, “The non-
stochastic multiarmed bandit problem,” SIAM J. Comput., vol. 32, no. 1,
pp. 48–77, 2002.
